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Abstract
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual in-
completeness with the existence of imperfect but contractible performance measures. Con-
tractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identiﬁed with make and buy. The perfor-
mance measure on which comprehensive contracts can be written is imperfect in the sense
of being subject to manipulation. The main result is that the impact — or “externality” — of
manipulation on true performance is key; a positive (negative) such externality favors make
(buy).
JEL Classiﬁcation: D23, L22, L24
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The distinction between “make” and “buy” may seem too obvious to attract attention by
laymen. While this may reﬂect reasonable judgment, the scientiﬁc endeavor of illuminating the
distinction and understanding the forces that determine real-world make-or-buy decisions is a
fundamental one.
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1In this paper, we will try to synthesize two existing approaches in order to obtain a parsi-
monious framework within which the distinction between make and buy arises endogenously.
The approach springs from two strands of literature. First, it builds on the assumption that
there are limits to contracting, thus adhering to the literature on incomplete contracts by as-
suming that assets — and the residual revenue streams generated by assets — cannot be subject
to elaborate sharing contracts. Secondly, it maintains that there are substantive contingencies
that can sustain incentive contracts; in this we build on comprehensive contracting theory in
focusing on the incentives created by such contracts.
A simple example Consider the standard story of a person, “the principal,” who owns
an item for sale and wishes to have someone else, “the agent,” sell it. The principal’s concern is
the net revenue from the sale, and absent direct enforcement of the agent’s eﬀort, the payment
is the sole basis for remuneration of the agent.
The principal may or may not be able to verify the payment with certainty. Even if it is
veriﬁable, however, it may still be that, for instance, the agent has sold the item to a friend
at an unduly low price; this would be an instance of manipulation in our sense. In light of
such possibilities, the principal may opt for either of two alternatives: (i) to insulate the agent
as far as possible from interest in the sale and ascertain that the ultimate transaction takes
place between the principal and the buyer, i.e. to make the agent an intermediary with minimal
interest in the transaction; or, (ii) to sell the item to the agent, thereby aligning the agent’s
further incentives completely with the principal’s own original incentives. In this example, the
tenet of standard principal-agent theory is upset by the contractual incompleteness; instead of
trading oﬀ incentives and risk sharing by a suitable revenue-sharing formula, the principal will
provide either weak or strong incentives in order to minimize the scope for manipulation of the
basis for such a formula. Applied to this example, the results below show that the risk-sharing-
vs.-incentives tradeoﬀ remains in so far that a more risk-averse agent faces weaker incentives,
but the incentives will vary discontinuously with the degree of risk aversion.
Basic approach The undertaking attempted in this paper is to develop a simple principal-
agent framework within which the distinction between “employing” an agent (make), and hiring
an “independent” agent (buy) arises endogenously and can be parameterized in such a way that
a direct comparison can be made. Speciﬁcally, the “true outcome” of the project undertaken
belongs to the owner of an underlying asset, contracting on which is plagued by incomplete-
contracting limitations. At the same time, there exists a performance measure derived from the
2“true outcome” but subject to manipulation by the agent; this measure can be the basis for a
comprehensive contract.
Having set out and justiﬁed this famework, we go on to ask the question how variation
among activities in terms of manipulability of the performance measure can guide the make-or-
buy decision. The conclusion is that a negative “externality” of manipulation on the productive
outcome favors contracting with an independent agent, whereas a positive externality favors
employing the agent. The basic intuition is, somewhat crudely, that each regime imposes
a constraint on the relative price between productive eﬀort and manipulation; independence
combines strong incentives for productive eﬀort with weak manipulation incentives, whereas
employment generates moderate incentives in both regards.
Background Leading sources of insight into the make-or-buy decision are transaction-
cost economics, and the property-rights approach.1 A key conclusion is that activities involving
two parties for whom speciﬁc investments in a relationship are important are more likely to
be integrated by one of the parties; the reason is that the party making a speciﬁc investment
under non-integration is more likely to be subject to “hold-up” by the other party, undermining
incentives to make speciﬁc investments.2
The key assumption within the property-rights approach is that contractual incomplete-
ness (due ultimately to unforeseen contingencies) makes all contracts renegotiable.T h i sm a k e s
the parties’ payoﬀs depend on renegotiation bargaining, where the outside options aﬀect the
outcome; parties therefore spend resources investing in their outside options. Ownership of
assets — ownership giving residual control rights — determines the payoﬀs in disagreement (i.e.
the outside options), as well as the sensitivity of those payoﬀs to investments. Under plausi-
ble assumptions, this creates incentives to overinvest in outside options and to underinvest in
relationship-speciﬁc capital. The allocation of ownership of assets can be used to ameliorate
the underinvestment problem.
While the property-rights approach is conceptually convincing, it suﬀers from the weakness
that contracts are reduced to merely benchmarks for renegotiation; this eﬀectively rules out the
use of explicit incentive schemes that are clearly often important in practice.3 T h ei m p o r t a n c eo f
1Key contributions within transaction-cost economics are Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985). The seminal
contributions within the property-rights approach are Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990);
see Hart (1995) and Holmström (1999) for clear and simple accounts of the basic logic.
2A party is subject to hold-up if another party threatens to withdraw from trade — in which case the speciﬁc
asset would be ineﬃciently utilized — in order to appropriate all, or a large portion, of the surplus.
3Interestingly and importantly, there is a recent development of the property-rights approach stressing “con-
3incentive schemes, moreover, depends on the measurement and contractibility characteristics of
the activity subject to the make-or-buy decision. Baker (1992, 2002), Holmström and Milgrom
(1991 and 1994), and Holmström (1999) have devised models where performance measures are
manipulable and/or multi-dimensional, and brought these observations to bear in theoretical
analyses of the make-or-buy decision.4 There is, moreover, empirical work indicating that
measurement aspects are important for explaining the make-or-buy decision: In their work on
in-house versus independent sales forces, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Anderson (1985)
found measurement-related explanatory variables to stand out most strongly.
There is some literature dealing directly with the manipulability of performance measures.
The focus of this literature is the limits that manipulability imposes on incentive provision, and it
is generally concluded that manipulability does, indeed, limit the feasibility and the desirability
of strong explicit incentives; this is true e.g. in Crocker and Slemrod (2007) and Goldman and
Slezak (2006) and this point is also made in Baker (1992).5 As far as we know, however, no
work in this tradition explores the implications of the object of manipulation shifting with make
vs. buy.
The related work by Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2008) builds on the core idea that market
incentives sometimes induce too much “signaling eﬀort,” i.e. eﬀort to inﬂate others’ assessment
of performance without promoting performance per se; they mention schooling and delegated
asset management as examples where this may be a signiﬁcant problem. Their analysis is
devoted to exploring why incentives are, in general, weaker in ﬁrms and, even more so, in
governments, than in markets.6 Notably, they work in a “contract-free” environment, and
tracts as reference points” (Hart and Moore, 2008; Hart, 2008). The focus of this literature, however, is on
behavioral implications of the contract in place for renegotiation. If, e.g. a party is unhappy with the outcome
of renegotiation (relative to a reference point inﬂuenced by the contract), that party may engage in “shading”
performance.
4In Holmström and Milgrom (1991) it is argued that strong monetary incentives and rules governing how a
task is accomplished are substitutes in structuring appropriate over-all incentives. In Holmström and Milgrom
(1994), the complementarities among a set of instruments for aﬀecting performance in a given task, and the
implications of such complementarities for empirical work, are analyzed. Holmström (1999) explores how the
p o w e rt os t r u c t u r ei n c e n t i v e s—ak e yt r a i to ft h eﬁrm — may or may not be determined by asset ownership.
5There are also instances of work exploring more indirect implications of manipulability; for example, Friebel
and Guriev (2005) explore the implications or manipulation in a hierarchy where this gives lower-level managers
leverage against their superiors in a way that turns out to undermine incentives.
6They consider a career-concerns model with a “good” and a “bad” component of eﬀort; after showing that
market incentives may be excessively strong, they argue that ﬁrms can remedy this by creating, by design,
a moral-hazard-in-teams problem; they also argue that competition between ﬁr m sa l l o w sr e m n a n t so fm a r k e t
4hence do not address questions about the properties of actual incentive contracts.
Levin and Tadelis (2005) also study the make-or-buy decision by devising a simple theoretical
model — driven by contract-administration costs — for generating and testing predictions from
contracting by US cities.7
2B a s i c f r a m e w o r k
We will consider a simple linear principal-agent model where the principal has an exogenously
given task that she cannot solve by herself. At the other end is an agent, who in the end solves
the task; the agent may be thought of as a worker or a subdivision of a ﬁrm (make), or as a
subcontractor (buy). The agent may exert eﬀort on the task itself on the one hand, and on
inﬂuencing — manipulating — the performance measure on the other.
The principal, P, is a risk neutral proﬁt maximizer, whose beneﬁt from completion of the
task has a ﬁxed component, B>0, and a variable component that can be thought of as the
net monetary outcome.
The agent, A, cares about income, y,a n de ﬀort. He exerts eﬀort a on the task and he
exerts eﬀort d on manipulating the performance measure. He is risk averse, and his utility from










with rA > 0 the agent’s level of absolute risk aversion; the speciﬁc utility function is assumed for
tractability. The agent has reservation payoﬀ uA.8 Without loss of generality, we will assume
that uA = −1.
The agent exerts eﬀort, a, on a task whose outcome — e.g. a measure of realized proﬁts or
cost savings — is x given by
x = a + ε,
where ε is a random variable reﬂecting the fact that the outcome is aﬀected but not determined
by the agent’s eﬀort; ε is normally distributed with mean zero and variance v. The contract
incentives to trickle down to employees, and that this eﬀect can be avoided by governments.
7Another instance of related work is Tadelis (2002), who draws on work by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) on
ﬁxed-price versus cost-plus contracting in procurement to argue that the complexity of an activity makes “make”
a more likely outcome of the make-or-buy decision.
8As we will note below, one way to introduce interactions into the model would be to consider an interde-
pendence between a and d in the agent’s preferences; this was done in a previous version, but here we consider
interactions through the technology.
5governing the agent’s reward, however, can be based only on a performance measure, z,t h a ti s
subject to manipulation,
z = x + γd = a + ε + γd, (1)
where γ ≥ 0 is a constant; for γ =0 , the problem is completely standard as we will note below.
One may note that the agent may want to either inﬂate (d>0)o rd e ﬂate (d<0) performance,
which we allow; given z’s dependence on d and the quadratic cost, either is equally costly.
Contracts are assumed to be linear in the relevant performance measures.9 That is,
y = F + mz
for constants F and m.
Residual income and regimes It is often presumed that incentives “originating in” an orga-
nization are weaker than incentives generated in contractual relations between organizations.10
A core purpose of this paper is to provide some justiﬁcation for this in a framwork where incen-
tive contracts matter. We will make a precise distinction between an employed agent and an
independent agent below, and we will refer to the two cases as two regimes, make and buy. The
distinction between the regimes arises from output being subject to incomplete contracting, but
in contrast to the property-rights approach there is a fully contractible performance measure
that approximates output in our framework.
Output accrues through an asset that is, at least for practical purposes, indivisible; true
performance, x, accrues as the proceeds of the asset and cannot be subject to a sharing contract.
The assumptions about the asset are thus in line with the property-rights approach although
it plays the sole role of carrying the proceeds of output.11 An employed agent is deﬁned by
the principal owning the asset; the value produced by the eﬀorts thus accrues to the principal,
whose payoﬀ is
B + x − Remp(z), (2)
9The most convincing rationale for linear contracts is provided by Holmström and Milgrom (1987); the essence
of the argument is that when the agent can adjust eﬀort when observing intermediate result — as modeled
sophisticatedly in the paper — non-linearities can be exploited in a way that makes them unattractive.
10As we have noted, this is a widely shared presumption, articulated e.g. by Williamson (1998).
11The property-rights approach is presented by e.g. Hart (1995); while Hart dismisses unreﬂected reliance on
“residual income” in modeling, he also stresses the point that residual income in most cases and for good reasons
goes together with the residual control rights that come with ownership. Importantly, the dynamics that generate
implications for investement incentives within the property-rights approach are absent from the model considered
here.
6where z is the available performance measure and where Remp(z) is the remuneration to the
agent. An independent agent, on the other hand, owns the asset and the value produced by the
eﬀort accrues directly to him; the principal’s payoﬀ is then
B − Rind(z) (3)
where Rind(z) is the contracted remuneration to the agent; the agent’s income in this case is
Rind(z)+x.N o t et h a ti tm a yw e l lb et h ec a s et h a t∂Rind/∂z is negative reﬂecting the principal’s
risk-sharing with an independent agent; thisw i l li nf a c ta l w a y sb et h ec a s ei nt h es p e c i ﬁcation
considered below. Note ﬁnally that z is the same across regimes; this puriﬁes the analysis but
it is clearly not a statement of fact and we will comment on it below.
2.1 Optimal contracts
An employed agent Consider ﬁrst the case of an employed agent. The principal solves
(where expectations are w.r.t. the distribution of ε)12
max
m,F





F + m(a + γd) − a2/2 − d2/2 − rAm2v/2
¢ª
≥ uA,






F + m(a + γd) − a2/2 − d2/2 − rAm2v/2
¢ª¢
.
Maximization by the agent yields
a = m, and d = γm; (4)
inserting this and taking logarithms we get
max −F +( 1− m)m − m2γ2 (5)
s.t. F + m2 + m2γ2 − m2/2 − m2γ2/2 − rAm2v/2 ≥−ln(−uA)/rA.
Note that the right-hand side of the participation constraint is the “reservation certainty equiv-
alent,” and that this object is zero since we have assumed uA = −1. Solving the constraint —

























7which obviously must bind — for F, we get an unconstrained problem. Letting φ generically
denote objective functions, P maximizes
φ(m)=m − m2/2 − m2γ2/2 − rAm2v/2
with respect to m;t h eﬁrst-order condition is
φ0(m)=1− m − γ2m − rAmv =0 ,





follows directly. The problem generates a value function for P from employing the agent,













We see that the presence of manipulation, as parameterized by γ, weakens direct eﬀort incen-
tives; it is also costly from a welfare point of view.
An independent agent Next, we will consider how the problem is modiﬁed if the principal
opts for an independent agent. The management solves, having re-formulated the constraint as
above and noting that the “reservation certainty equivalent” is zero by construction,
max
m,F
E (B − (F + mz)) = B − (F + m(a + γd)),
s.t. F + m(a + γd)+a − a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0;
the diﬀerence is that actual output enters the agent’s rather than the principal’s payoﬀ and
the agent’s direct incentives to exert a are therefore strengthened by the direct eﬀect while his
incentives to exert d are unaﬀected. Maximization by the agent now yields
a =1+m; and d = γm. (9)
Note that the key diﬀerence between (4) and (9) is the diﬀerence in relative price. The direct
performance incentive (incentive for a) is relatively stronger with an independent agent; note,
however, that this may well call for m<0 in the independence case.
8Inserting equilibrium eﬀort and taking logarithms we get
max −F − m(1 + m) − m2γ2 (10)
s.t. F + m(1 + m)+m2γ2 +1+m − (1 + m)
2 /2 − m2γ2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0.
Solving the constraint as above, the principal maximizes the following objective function:
φ(m)=1+m − (1 + m)
2 /2 − m2γ2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2
with respect to m,w i t hﬁrst-order condition











Note that mind < 0,a n dt h a t1+mind >m emp;w ew i l lc o m eb a c kt ot h i s .
The problem generates a value function for P from contracting with an independent agent,





























− (1 + rAv)
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which after some manipluation of the numerator (extracting 1+γ2 + rAv as a common factor
accordingt to the “simpliﬁcation” below), gives
φ∗ind =
1+γ2 (1 − rAv)
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
(16)
to be compared with φ∗emp. We may note that eﬀective eﬀort incentives, 1+mind, are strength-
ened with increasing importance of manipulation (γ) while the value function is decreasing.13
Thus, the power of the incentives coming directly from the contract (mind) are reduced in the
independence case as well, and manipulation is costly here too.
























































First, one may note the obvious fact that when γ =0 , manipulation has no bite and the solutions
in the two cases co-incide completely. Next, we start by comparing equilibrium productive eﬀort,
a, across regimes; the diﬀerence in terms of incentive intensity — which is equal to the diﬀerence
in actual eﬀort in this case — is clear cut (with obvious notation):








In this setting, thus, an independent agent has unambiguously stronger performance incentives.
When it comes to regime choice, we have:
Proposition 1. The principal prefers to contract with an independent agent rather than em-
ploying an agent precisely if rAv ≤ 1.
Proof. The condition for an independent management to be optimal is that the following
expression be non-negative:
∆proﬁt = φ∗ind − φ∗emp =
1+γ2 (1 − rAv) − 1
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
.
The condition for an independent agent to be optimal is thus rAv ≤ 1.#
The result of the proposition is quite intuitive — risk exposure is unambiguously larger in
the independence case. In fact, the result can be seen as a discontinuous version of the standard
tradeoﬀ between incentives and risk-sharing. The neutrality of regime choice with respect to
γ, the impact of manipulation, is perhaps less intuitive, but it is consistent with the fact that
manipulation is costly — the value functions being decreasing — in both cases.14
3 Externalities of manipulation
The above result is too simple in a way; while it conveys a basic trade-oﬀ,i ti sd e r i v e di n
a framework with little interaction between manipulation, which is purely redistributive, and
14One may also note that whenever rAv 6=1 , the diﬀerence between the value functions is increasing in γ.
10productive eﬀort which determines the outcome. The obvious way to proceed is to allow for
interaction between manipulation and productive eﬀort. Such interaction can operate through
the agent’s preferences and/or through the technology. In the following, we will develop a
formulation where the interaction operates through the technology.15
In modeling terms, we will proceed by adding a term reﬂecting an externality to the linear
formulation for output.16 In this formulation, the externality aﬀects output; as we will note
below, one could also consider the case where the externality aﬀects the principal independently
of the regime; we will report that case brieﬂy towards the end of this section, ﬁnding that the
results are broadly similar.
We continue to denote “true output” by x,a n dw el e t
x = a + ε + σλ(d), (18)
where the externality is given by the function, λ(d),w e i g h t e db yσ.W e w i l l c o n s i d e r t w o
functional relationships:
λ(d)=d or λ(d)=|d|; (19)
the signiﬁc a n c eo fe a c ho ft h e s es p e c i ﬁcations will be discussed shortly. The weight, σ,c a nb e
positive or negative.
Before going to interpretations, we must extend the deﬁniton of the performance measure.
We will assume that the performance measure is, similarly to the previous section, given by
z = a + ε + γd.
This means that the externality does not aﬀect the performance measure, but this reﬂects only
an accounting convention.17
Interpretations The introduction of an externality enriches the model in two dimensions,
reﬂected by σ and λ in the above formulation. The externality of manipulation may be either
positive or negative (given by the sign of σ), and when performance is inﬂated and deﬂated,
respectively, the externality may either work similarly or in opposite directions (the form of λ).
15In a previous version we pursued the other route; we will comment on this below.
16The choice of the term “externality” is deliberate, reﬂecting the notion that manipulation as a primarily
redistributive activity aﬀects output in a way that is not directly dealt with by the contract.
17I.e., one could include the externality in the basis for z, with no implication for the result. More precisely,
re-deﬁning b γ = γ − σ, and assuming z = a + ε + σd + b γd gives an equivalent formulation for the case λ(d)=d
(expressions would change but the substantive results would be the same); similarly with b γ = γ +σ for the other
case.
11While the signiﬁcance of the sign of the externality has an obvious interpretation, the latter
distinction may call for elaboration; it is a distinction between:
• the case where the activity of manipulation is costly (or beneﬁcial) for output, in a way
that leads to a similar externality if the agent tries to inﬂate performance (d>0)o r
deﬂate performance (d<0); in formal terms, this is manifest in the cost of manipulation
depending on |d|; and,
• the case where the activity of manipulation has an impact on output that depends on
whether the agent tries to inﬂate or deﬂate performance; the simplest case is that where
the cost of manipulation depends on d.
With these distinctions introduced, there are four qualitative combinations illustrated in
Table 1 below where we also sketch some examples.
Positive (σ>0) Negative (σ<0)
Externality depending on |d| (iv) Perquisites (i) Manipulating accounting data
Externality depending on d (iii) Over-treatment (ii) Excessive cost control
Table 1. Four cases and some example-interpretations of d.
To build a bit of intuition, we elaborate the four cases.
(i) This case applies e.g. when manipulation is a separate activity that is costly in terms
of attention stolen from productive eﬀort; this, obviously, may spill over negatively on
the value of the asset/revenue stream itself independently of whether the agent aims at
inﬂating or deﬂating measured performance.
(ii) Here, the agent can inﬂate the performance measure by e.g. keeping costs at bay by
reducing the scope or quality of treatment, thus keeping down a veriﬁable set of activities
in which the agent must share costs.18 Another example would be the possibility of
avoiding (unveriﬁable) costs by cutting corners (maintaining equipment only occasionally);
if performance is e.g. measured proﬁt or measured punctuality, this has likely a negative
externality on the asset.
18We will come back to this context of the agent being able to aﬀect the set of activities. While an employed
agent may want to the set of activities in order not to be punished on the margin, an independent agent may face
an incentive, ceteris paribus, to expand the set of activities in order to have more costs shared by the principal.
12(iii) The agent may e.g. inﬂate the performance measure by insisting on a higher-quality
treatment (again with a veriﬁable set of activities) in cases where the agent has a positive
stake in marginal performance. The diﬀerence between this case and case (ii) is that
inﬂation of the performance measure generates a positive externality.
(iv) The ﬁnal case is probably the least common in practice; manipulation is costly but has
a positive externality on output independently of sign. An example that might exhibit a
pattern like this (for small γ) may be perquisites, such as the possibility to mind certain
private business at work which may increase the agent’s motivation and spill over posi-
tively on the productive activity and thus the principal whether the direct eﬀect on the
performance measure is positive or negative.
3.1 Analysis
We now proceed by presenting the analysis for the two cases — the case where eﬀort cost depends
on d and where it depends on |d| — in turn. The full analysis is available in the Appendix. We
will, recalling that x = a+ε+σλ(d), and that measured performance is z = a+ε+γd proceed
by presenting the key considerations in each case. In order to focus on interesting cases we will
assume two bounds on the externality; we assume that:
1. |σ| ≤ γ, which rules out the externality being the dominant force relative to performance
manipulation in the trade-oﬀsc o n c e r n i n gd; this is to keep in line with the spirit of the
model; and
2. |σ|γ ≤ 1, which gurantees that the marginal returns to manipulation (through the exter-
nality) are no larger than the marginal returns to productive eﬀort.
Externality depends on d We start by considering the analytically simpler case of the
externality depending on d. The conclusion is quite simple in this case:
Proposition 2. The principal prefers to contract with an independent agent rather than em-





The full proof is provided in the Appendix, and the essence of the formal argument is
outlined below; it is illustrated in Figure 1; as the externality grows in importance (i.e. grows





Figure 1: Basic result
and independence grows more attractive in the case of a negative externality. The condition
has a simple interpretation: within the bounds assumed, a positive externality of manipulation
on output makes employing the agent more attractive; a negative externality makes contracting
with an independent agent more attractive.19
The basic intuition for the proposition stems from two forces. On the one hand, an inde-
pendent agent internalizes the externality; this, obviously, favors independence. On the other
hand, however, the basic incentive-vs-risk-sharing problem creates second-best distortions that
are reduced in the employment regime when the externality is positive. More precisely, the
constraint on the relative price between productive eﬀort and manipulation makes incentives
“positively aligned” in the employment case, and “divergent” in the independence case; with a
positive externality, positively aligned incentives are desirable.20
Formal argument Employed agent: In this case, the agent faces the same situation as in
the previous section, and he chooses
a = m, and d = γm; (20)
19As is noted in the Appendix, the comparison is uncomplicated given the bound |σ| ≤ γ; outside this bound,
independence is, in fact, unambigously preferable.
20In fact, when σ approaches 1, the incentives of an independent agent become more similar to those of a an
employed agent, and the size of the advantage of employment decreases.






The impact of the externality is not surprising; the principal will strengthen incentives in
response to a positive externality and weaken incentives in response to a negative externality.









which reﬂects a strong dependence of the principal’s payoﬀ on the sign of the externality.
Independent agent: In this case, the agent faces the externality directly, and he chooses
a = m, and d = γm+ σ; (23)
this choice feeds back to the principal’s problem so as to give the same optimal incentive intensity








The incentive scheme is thus independent of the externality, whereas the agent’s manipulation
depends on it. The joint eﬀect on the value function is
φ∗ind =
1+γ2 (1 − rAv)
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
+ σ2/2; (25)
here, the externality is beneﬁcial independently of its sign, the intuition being that the agent
can adjust to it and take advantage of it, i.e. that the agent internalizes it.
Comparisons: The ultimate goal of the analysis is to compare the principal’s payoﬀsa n d
thereby understand the choice of regime, but we start by comparing equilibrium eﬀort, a.T h e
diﬀerence in eﬀort is equal to the diﬀerence in terms of the relevant incentive intensity:
∆a = a∗ind − a∗emp =1+mind − memp =
γ2 (1 − σ/γ)
1+γ2 + rAv
, (26)
which is positive as long as |σ| ≤ γ, as we have assumed. In this setting, thus, an independent
agent has unambiguously stronger performance incentives. One may also note that manipulation
is unambiguously positive in the employment case, whereas it is negative unless σ is too large
in the independence case.
As to the choice of regime, the comparison of the value functions in (22) and (25) is straight-
forward, and the result in the proposition follows.
15Externality depends on |d| The case where the externality depends on |d| turns out to
produce a condition that is similar to that of Proposition 2. The analysis raises, however, a set
of complications that need to be dealt with. The complications are due to the absolute value; as
we noted above, manipulation is often negative in the independence case, and this means that
the absolute value matters in a way that is not straightforward since d is endogenous. The way
we will deal with this is to repeat the above analysis under the assumption that (with obvious
notation) dind < 0, and then go back to see under what parameter conﬁg u r a t i o n st h i si sv a l i d ;
ﬁnally we go through the remaining cases. The conclusion is:














and γ ≤ 1 the principal always prefers to contract with an independent agent.
Again, we sketch the basic formal argument in the text below, while providing a full argument
in the Appendix. The last case involves a bit more legwork in terms of computation and this is
relegated to the Appendix in its entirity, but the result is simple under the condition that γ ≤ 1
(which is a minor strengthening of |σ|γ ≤ 1 since this is the case where σ is large negative);
the condition is suﬃcient in the sense that even if γ is larger, independence is optimal under a
large critical level of rAv.
Formal argument Since we always have d>0 for an employed agent, the solution and
value function remain the same when we turn to considering λ(d)=|d|; we thus proceed directly
to the independence case.
We start by solving the problem given d<0. In this case, the agent faces the externality
directly, and the fact that |d| = −d when d<0 means that the the analysis is similar except
we need to replace σ by −σ; the agent thus chooses
a = m, and d = γm− σ; (27)
16and the property that the incentive scheme is unaﬀected by σ remains true. The expressions in
(24) are therefore still valid; less obviously, the value function, too, is unaﬀected:
φ∗ind =
1+γ2 (1 − rAv)
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
+ σ2/2. (28)
We can thus re-state the observation that the externality is beneﬁcial independently of its sign.
This, in turn, immediately implies that the comparisons in terms of productive eﬀort, a,a n d
regime choice remain unaﬀected.
When is d<0? Next, we explore the conditions under which the preceeding analysis is
valid. We saw that









i.e. that σ not be too negative.
In order to verify that this is indeed a solution, one must ﬁnally check that there does not
exist superior solution to the agent’s problem with d>0 for some parameter values; this is
done in the Appendix.
One may also note that eﬀective performance incentive as measured by the equilibrium level
of productive eﬀort, a, are always stronger in the indedendence case for the parameter values
covered by Propositon 3 (see the Appendix).
3.2 Results and interpretations
The idea of this paper is to ﬁnd a simple and parsimonious framework for addressing the issue
of how characteristics of activities map into make-or-buy choices. The intended contribution is
both in terms of foundation — having set out a set of assumptions that generate two distinct
regimes — and in terms of application. In terms of foundation, the framework synthesizes
elements from incomplete-contracting and comprehensive-contracting frameworks in a way that
is, arguably, conceptually appealing. On a general note, the ultimate incentives for exerting
productive eﬀort — as measured by actual eﬀort — are always stronger in the independence case;
this is in line with systematic as well as casual empirical observation.
In terms of application, manipulation possibilities clearly constitute a relevant element in
many principal-agent relationships. Before we discuss empirical implications, we will elaborate
a little bit about the results in terms of regime choice, i.e., the choice whether an activity is
17undertaken within an organization or bought in the marketplace. The relative attractiveness of
the two regimes depend on three properties within the model:
1. the joint measure of the risk exposure of the agent, measured by rAv;
2. the eﬀect that manipulation has on the underlying performance, termed the externality
its sign and strength being measured by σ; and,
3. the extent, γ, to which manipulation aﬀects the performance measure.
In addition to this, we have considered two speciﬁcations of the structure of the externality
—i t sd e p e n d i n go nd or |d| — but the basic results have been similar. The principal’s choice
is between employing an agent or contracting with an independent agent, and the results are
quite clear-cut:
• A higher risk exposure makes the choice of an employed agent more attractive. This is in
line with expectation.
• The externality has a clear implication: a negative externality favors contracting with an
independent agent, while a positive externality favors employing an agent.
• The sensitivity of the performance measure to manipulation has the eﬀect of moderating
the externality; as γ grows, the critical level of risk exposure tends towards one, the value
that applies in the absence of an externality.
The driving assumption is that the underlying outcome is owned by the principal in the
case of an employed agent, but is owned by an independent agent. This implies that the incen-
tives coming from the contract come on top of the direct incentives for an independent agent;
since manipulation incentives come exclusively from the contract, the relative price between
productive eﬀort and manipulations diﬀers across the two regimes.
The basic intuition for the results is that while an independent agent generally internalizes
the externality in a way that an employed agent does not, this is more valuable in the case of
a negative externality. Moreover, in the case of a positive externality, the restrictions placed
on incentives by the two available sets of relative prices (resulting from the respective regimes)
favor emplying the agent, in which case incentives for productive eﬀort and manipulation are
positively aligned.
We have mentioned the possibility that the externality would always hit the principal, rather
than the owner of the asset. We have performed the analysis for this case as well with mostly
18similar conclusions; the analysis is available from the author.21 More precisely, the analysis is
essentially unaﬀected for the case where the impact of the externality depends on d,w h e r e a s
some results change in the other case. When the impact of the externality depends on |d|,
the critical risk exposure stays constant (at rAv =1 ) within a range (σ ∈ [−γ/2,γ/2]); for
more strongly negative externalities independence is always optimal, for more strongly positive
externalities employoment is always optimal.
We have made reference above to a previous version where there was no technological in-
teraction, but where there was a dependence between the two eﬀorts, a and d, in the agent’s
utility function. In more precise terms, there was a parameter, ρ, measuring the strength of
competition between the eﬀorts.22 The results were similar in so far that the role that the
externality plays in this framework was played by ρ in the other formulation (albeit inversely,
a positive ρ having the the eﬀect of a negative externality). Intuitively, ρ is a measure of the
severity of the manipulation problem in a way that is akin to that of a negative externality.
Empirical implications The empirical implications of the framework and the analysis are
closely tied to the interpretation of manipulation. In general terms, the conclusion that neg-
ative eﬀects of manipulation on productive eﬀort makes independence more likely seems quite
reasonable; a simple example would be the intractability of employing an agent for an only-cash
street sale in the absence of elaborate measures to prevent the agent from keeping a signiﬁcant
extra-contractual bonus.
On a completely diﬀerent note, Anderson (1985) makes an interesting observation in the
context of explaining the choice between in-house sales people and external representatives.
Anderson notes that “But, contrary to expectations, the greater the possibility of the customer
developing loyalty to the salesperson, the greater the likelyhood of using a rep.” (p. 248).
Loyalty between the salesperson and the customer expands the feasible set of manipulation
that is not threatened by whistle-blowing by the customer, and thus plausibly re-inforces the
potential for negative repercussions on the undertaking and on the principal.
One set of circumstances in which our framework seems relevant is that with an endogenous
choice of the scope or the quality of an activity. Suppose that the agent can persuade the
principal to aﬀect the set of activities and that the agent’s stake in the economic outcome is m.
If the variation in economic outcome comes from costs and m>0, the agent will want limit
the number of activities. When m<0, there may (this is beyond the letter of the model but
21It is the second Appendix in this version.
22Even more precisely, the cost-of-eﬀort function was c(a,d)=a
2/2+ρad + d
2/2.
19could straightforwardly be introduced) be scope for inﬂating reported costs in such a way that
the contract-based cost-sharing is weighted more heavily than the true costs (in the extreme,
true costs are borne according to 1+m; contracted costs are borne according to m); in such
a case there would be an incentive for an independent agent to expand the set of activities.
While a bit speculative, these respective patterns may be relevant in insurance-oriented and
budgetary-based health insurance systems; in so far that there is a positive externality of excess
activities — i.e. a negative externality of d — this is an argument in favor of insurance-oriented
systems.
As a ﬁnal example, one may note that the model by construction, but nevertheless impor-
tantly, illustrates that activities with similar external conditions may choose diﬀerent regimes;
a small change in a parameter starting close to the critical value can induce a jump. This is, for
example, consistent with the dichotomy observed in the context of franchising. The dichotomy
stems from the observation in e.g. retailing and fast-food restaurants that outlets run by an
in-house management co-exist with franchised outlets, and that the incentives structures diﬀer
fundamentally; it is thus clearly a distinction between regimes with features similar to the make
and buy features in our framework. The key consideration in these contexts is, arguably, a fear
of quality shading; the prediction of our model is that the dichotomy is natural given variation
in e.g. the severity of the measurement problem (γ) and the agent’s risk aversion (rA).
As a ﬁnal remark we comment on the assumption that parameters — i.e.γ and the speciﬁca-
tion of the externality — are the same accross regimes. Beyond the fact that it keeps the model
as simple as possible, it is important to note that the comparative-statics conclusions would not
be sensitive to changing the assumption in this regard. For real-world outsourcing decisions, on
the other hand, it is clearly possible that parameters diﬀer across regimes. For instance, there
may be less room for manipulation under employment (γemp<γind) which obviously would favor
employment ceteris paribus; such a diﬀerence would have a natural interpretation in terms of
monitoring in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper is an attempt to build a simple framework within which the distinction between
make and buy — between performing an activity within a ﬁrm or organization (employment)
and having it performed by an outside (independent) party — arises endogenously. Put some-
what pretentiously, the framework is a synthesis between an incomplete-contracting approach
recognizing indivisibilities and limits of contracting, and a comprehensive-contracting approach
20recognizing that there exist (imperfect) performance measures that can be subject to compre-
hensive contracting. The source of the imperfection of contractible performance measures is the
fact that they can be manipulated by the agent in a simple principal-agent framework. The
analysis shows that the way in which manipulation aﬀects the agent’s cost of eﬀort and mea-
sured performance have implications for the choice between make and buy. The main conclusion
is that a more severe manipulation problem — in the sense of manipulation exerting a stronger
negative externality on the productive activity — makes it more attractive to buy, i.e. work with
an independent agent.
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6A p p e n d i x
In the Appendix we will provide the details of the analysis taking account of the externality,
i.e., when the technology is given by:
x = a + ε + σλ(d); z = a + ε + γd
where either λ(d)=d or λ(d)=|d|. We start with the former case.
226.1 Optimal contracts, λ(d)=d
An employed agent The principal’s problem is
max
m,F





F + m(a + γd) − a2/2 − d2/2 − rAm2v/2
¢ª
≥ uA,






F + m(a + γd) − a2/2 − d2/2 − rAm2v/2
¢ª¢
.
Maximization by the agent yields
a = m, and d = γm; (29)
inserting this and taking logarithms we get, using the assumption that uA = −1,
max
m,F
−F +( 1− m)m + σγm− m2γ2 (30)
s.t. F + m2 + m2γ2 − m2/2 − m2γ2/2 − rAm2v/2 ≥ 0.
Note that the right-hand side of the participation constraint is the “reservation certainty equiv-
alent.”
Solving the constraint — which obviously must bind — for F, we get an unconstrained problem.
Letting φ generically denote objective functions, P maximizes
φ(m)=( 1+σγ)m − m2/2 − m2γ2/2 − rAm2v/2
with respect to m;t h eﬁrst-order condition is






follows directly. The problem generates a value function for P,














23An independent agent Next, we will consider how the problem is modiﬁed if the principal
opts for an independent agent. The principal solves (again, recall that uA = −1)
max
m,F
E (B − (F + mz)) = B − (F + m(a + γd)),
s.t. F + m(a + γd)+a + σd− a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0;
the diﬀerence is that actual output enters the agent’s rather than the principal’s payoﬀ and the
agent’s incentives to exert a are therefore strengthened by the direct eﬀect while his incentives
to exert d aﬀected by the externality. Maximization by the agent now yields
a =1+m; and d = γm+ σ. (34)
Inserting equilibrium eﬀort, simplifying a bit, and taking logarithms we get
max −F − m(1 + m) − m2γ2 − γmσ (35)
s.t. F + m2γ2 + γmσ+ σ(γm+ σ)+( 1+m)
2 /2 − (γm+ σ)
2 /2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0.
Solving the constraint as above, the principal maximizes the following objective function:





2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2
with respect to m,w i t hﬁrst-order condition











The problem generates a value function for P,



















































− (1 + rAv)
¡
1+γ2¢2 − γ2 (rAv)
2
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
2 + σ2/2, (42)





1+γ2 (1 − rAv)
¢
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
2 + σ2/2, (43)
φ∗ind =
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We start by comparing equilibrium eﬀort, a;t h i sd i ﬀerence is equal to the diﬀerence in terms
of incentive intensity in this case:




γ2 (1 − σ/γ)
1+γ2 + rAv
, (45)
which is positive as long as |σ| ≤ γ as assumed. In this setting, thus, an independent agent has
unambiguously stronger performance incentives.
The condition for an independent management to be optimal is that the following expression
be non-negative:
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− (1 + σγ)





25The condition for an independent agent to be optimal is thus,








≤ γ2 − 2σγ + σ2 =( γ − σ)
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6.3 Optimal contracts, λ(d)=|d|
As we noted in the text, the employment case is unaﬀected by the change of λ; we thus proceed
directly to the independence case.
An independent agent We are going to use the fact that since |d| = −d when d<0,w e
can simply use (−d) i nt h ea n a l y s i sa sl o n ga sw ec a nb es u r et h a td is negative. We will then
check that this is valid and explore the remaining cases. The management solves
max
m,F
E (B − (F + mz)) = B − (F + m(a + γd)),
s.t. F + m(a + γd)+a − σd− a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0.
Maximization by the agent now yields
a =1+m; and d = γm− σ. (48)
Inserting equilibrium eﬀort, simplifying a bit, and taking logarithms we get
max −F − m(1 + m) − m2γ2 + γmσ (49)
s.t. F + m2γ2 − γmσ− σ(γm− σ)+( 1+m)
2 /2 − (γm− σ)
2 /2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0.
Solving the constraint as above, the principal maximizes the following objective function:





2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 (50)
23One may note that whenever |σ| >γ , independence is optimal since the RHS is postive, while the LHS is
negative; for σ = γ, there is indiﬀerence. Note that this seemingly entails a discontinuity at σ = γ,b u tt h ea c t u a l
proﬁtd i ﬀerence is zero at σ = γ; the intuition is that the internalization eﬀect then becomes dominant.
26with respect to m,w i t hﬁrst-order condition











The value function for P is



















































− (1 + rAv)
¡
1+γ2¢2 − γ2 (rAv)
2
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
2 + σ2/2 (57)
to be compared with φ∗emp above. Note that this value function is identical to (42), and the
s a m ea n l y s i st h u sa p p l i e s .
N e x t ,w en e e dt ol o o ka ta c t u a ld:









In order to verify that this is indeed a solution, one must check that there does not exist another
solution (superior for the agent) with d>0 for some parameter values. The analysis of this
case was done above and we saw that with λ(d)=d (which coincides with λ(d)=|d| for d>0)
we have, recalling that m is the same in the two cases
















d is unambiguously negative under both speciﬁcations. Note that this interval expands with
rAv; it shrinks to zero when risk vanishes.
Remaining cases
Strong positive externality When the externality is strong enough, there are two con-
sistent solutions, with d positive and negative, to the agent’s proplem, which is
F + m(a + γd)+a + σ|d| − a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2.
• If d>0, the objective is
F + m(a + γd)+a + σd− a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2,
with solution and value:
d = γm+ σ;( γm+ σ)
2 /2.
• If d<0, the objective is
F + m(a + γd)+a − σd− a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2,
with solution and value:
d = γm− σ;( γm− σ)
2 /2.
• Since m<0, the latter possibility is obviously superior, and the solution with d<0 is
the relevant one in this case too.
Strong negative externality We now turn to the ﬁnal case of a strong negative exter-
nality; while the result in this case is clear-cut, the argument is a bit technical.
Agent’s best reply: The agent’s objective is still:
F + m(a + γd)+a + σ|d| − a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2.
Now, for ﬁxed m, there are three possibilities:
28• d>0:t h e nd must solve
max F + m(a + γd)+a + σd− a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2
which is a well-behaved problem with solution d = γm+σ; it can thus only be relevant if
γm+ σ>0, which is ruled out by m<0 and σ<0.
• d<0:t h e nd must solve
max F + m(a + γd)+a − σd− a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2
which is a well-behaved problem with solution d = γm−σ; it can thus only be relevant if
γm− σ<0, which was the case considered above.
• d =0 : If neither of these hold — i.e. if γm− σ>0 — the remaining possibility is d =0 .
Remark: In sum, this gives us a complete map of the agent’s best reply given m:
d =m i n{γm− σ,0}.
Principal’s response to d=0: The principal’s problem assuming d =0is
max
m,F
E (B − (F + mz)) = B − (F + ma),
s.t. F + ma + a − a2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0;
obviously, a =1+m, and one gets straightforwardly,
φ0(m)=( m +1 )− (1 + rAv)(m +1 )
2 /2 (58)
















Now, since md=0 <m ind (i.e.
¯ ¯md=0¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯mind¯ ¯),
γmd=0 − σ<γ m ind − σ.
This means that there are cases where the agent’s best reply to mind is d =0(γmind − σ ≥ 0)
whereas the principal’s myopically (i.e., taking d as given) optimal response to d =0creates
an incentive for d<0 (γmd=0 − σ<0). Denote by b m the principal’s ultimate choice (i.e.
incorporating the agent’s response); it is clear that:
29• it cannot be the case that γ b m − σ<0 since the principal’s relevant objective function
then is (50), which is well-behaved and which produces the solution mind unless there are
constraints;
• consider next γ b m − σ ≥ 0; the relevant objective function is then (58) and the uncon-
strained solution to the maximization of it is md=0 which, however, violates the constraint;
the solution is obviously choosing b m such that
γ b m − σ =0 .





the solution for the independence case entails the agent choosing d =0 , and the incentive
scheme is given by

















We have two cases:
• In the simpler case, there is no constraint on d and (59) is the relevant value; the diﬀerence
is then





















− (1 + rAv)
¡
1+2 σγ + σ2γ2¢
2(1+rAv)(1+γ2 + rAv)
=
γ2 − σγ(1 + rAv)(2+σγ)
2(1+rAv)(1+γ2 + rAv)
.
When b m is not limited by the constraint that γ b m−σ ≥ 0 (i.e. when γmd=0−σ ≥ 0), and
under the assumed parameter restrictions (|σγ| ≤ 1) independence is thus unambiguously
preferable.
• T h em o r ec u m b e r s o m ec a s ei st h a tw h e r ed =0but where the principal is bound by the





this case, it is harder to obtain a tractable tight bound, and we will provide a suﬃcient
condition for independence to be optimal in this case too. The principal’s objective is still
30deﬁned by d =0and the objective function — a function of m — in (58) applies; a notable
feature of this objective (following naturally from d =0 ) is that it does not depend on σ.
Consider the diﬀerence φ∗∗(m)=φ0(m) − φ∗emp:










at boundary where σ is just negative enough to give γmind−σ ≥ 0 (i.e. where γmind−σ =
0). When σ turns more negative from that point, two things happen: (i) σ has a direct
eﬀect through φ∗emp; and (ii) the constaint on m is relaxed. Both these eﬀects make



































We see that if γ ≤ 1 independence is unambiguously preferable. Note that given that this
case concerns σ strongly negative, the condition that γ ≤ 1 is quite weak given |σ|γ ≤ 1.




















1+γ2 (−rAv/(1 + rAv))
1+γ2 + rAv
=




(1 + γ2 + rAv)(1+rAv)
∆a ≥
γ2 + rAv + γ2rAv







































+ γ2rAv(1 + rAv)






− (1 + rAv)
(1 + rAv)(1+γ2 + rAv)
+
γ2rAv(1 + rAv)
(1 + rAv)(1+γ2 + rAv)
2 > 0.
Summary of cases
• d with sign — no issues;
•| d|:




, d<0 and the analysis of that case applies;




, d<0 and this goes through consistently;
— σ ≤− γrAv/(1 + rAv), the agent chooses d =0and this works through consistently;




,s t i l ld =0 , but a bit more compli-
cated (the principal re-optimizes m but this does not change d).
7 Externality on principal
First, we note that with an employed agent this analysis is similar to the main case; the
externality aﬀects the principal.
An independent agent Next, we will consider how the problem is modiﬁed if the principal
opts for an independent agent (the externality depends on d). The principal solves
max
m,F
E (B − (F + mz)) + σd = B − (F + m(a + γd)) + σd,
s.t. F + m(a + γd)+a − a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0;
32maximization by the agent yields
a =1+m; and d = γm,
and inserting equilibrium eﬀort and taking logarithms we get
max −F − m(1 + m) − m2γ2 + σγm (65)
s.t. F + m(1 + m)+m2γ2 +1+m − (1 + m)
2 /2 − (γm)
2 /2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0.
Solving the constraint, the principal maximizes the following objective function:





2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2
with respect to m,w i t hﬁrst-order condition











The problem generates a value function for P,
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Comparisons We start by comparing equilibrium eﬀort, a:




In this setting, thus, an independent agent has unambiguously stronger performance incentives.
The condition for an independent management to be optimal is that the following expression
be non-negative:
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The condition for an independent agent to be optimal is thus,









For |σ| ≤ γ/2 we thus have a result that is similar to the case in the text, re-scaled by a factor
two; for σ outside these bounds, it is easily seen from (79) that for σ<−γ/2, independence is
always optimal, and σ>γ / 2 for employment is always optimal.
34Independence — externality depending on |d| and actual d negative We assume that




E (B − (F + mz)) + σd = B − (F + m(a + γd)) − σd,
s.t. F + m(a + γd)+a − a2/2 − d2/2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2 ≥ 0;
the agent chooses
a =1+m; and d = γm,
and we get





2 − rA (1 + m)
2 v/2
with ﬁrst-order condition with respect to m,











The value function for P is






















φ∗ind =1+( 1− σγ)
−σγ − rAv
1+γ2 + rAv
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Comparisons We start by comparing equilibrium eﬀort, a:




In this setting, thus, an independent agent has unambiguously stronger performance incentives
within the bounds |σ| ≤ γ/2.
The condition for an independent management to be optimal is that the following expression
be non-negative:
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¡
2σγ − γ2¢
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2
2(1+γ2 + rAv)
The condition for an independent agent to be optimal is thus,







The sign issue — when is d<0 We have:










36• for the true loss function, σ|d|:w eh a v et h r e ec a s e s
1.
|σγ| ≤ rAv =⇒ mind ≤ 0= ⇒ loss function − σd gives correct solution
2.
σγ > rAv =⇒ potential multiplicity due to beneﬁts from manipulation of any sign
The two canidate solutions generated by mind+ and mind-:
φ∗ind+ =






























In conclusion, the loss function −σd applies here too.
3.
−σγ > rAv









There are three possibilities for m:
— ∗ m>0: since the objective function is well-behaved this implies that |m| = m





this is possible only if σγ > rAv, and thus inconsistent;
∗ m<0: since the objective function is well-behaved this implies that |m| =





this is possible only if −σγ < rAv, and thus consistent;
∗ m =0 :t h i si st h eo n l yp o s s i b i l i t y .
37We ﬁn a l l yn e e dt ot e s tm =0 :









independence is optimal if









Now, conﬁning interest to the case where |σγ| ≤ 1 — which implies that rAv<1 since −σγ > rAv





− (1 + σγ)




− (1 + σγ)
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• d with sign — no issues;
•| d|
— σγ > rAv a bit special but ultimately covered by analysis of the next case;
— |σγ| <r Av implies m<0 and rAv =1is uniformly critical;
— σγ < −rAv,a sl o n ga s|σγ| ≤ 1, independence is always optimal.
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